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AIR HIGH JACKING AS A POLITICAL CRIME-
WHO SHOULD JUDGE?
In 1961, a new type of criminal burst upon the interna-
tional scene; the aircraft highjacker. This type of crime had oc-
curred before, but prior highjackers were either the pilot or some-
one who was sufficiently skilled to fly a multi-engine aircraft.'
The new technique of using a real or pretended weapon to sub-
due the crew and direct the plane's movement greatly enlarged
the potential for this type of crime. Indeed, prior to 1962, there
was a worldwide total of forty-three highjackings. From 1962
through July 1970, there were 192 incidents of aircraft highjack-
ings.2
Action taken to deter aircraft highjacking has not been
notably effective. One major international Convention has been
ratified' and another signed.4 An intra-continental Convention
has also been signed., Many nations have passed internal laws
which strictly punish aircraft highjacking.6 These international
Conventions and the internal laws have operated from two basic
premises. The first is that highjacking is primarily political. The
second is that if the state of registration of the aircraft can be
assured of automatic extradition of the highjacker by the state in
which the highjacked aircraft lands, the motivation to highjack
will be severely curtailed. 7  These premises are not necessarily
valid. The only major psychiatric study of aircraft highjackers to
date indicates that highjackers are apolitical and commit the crime
1. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER 211 (1971).
2. Id. at 257. This data was compiled from the records of the Federal
Aviation Administration.
3. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 8364 (1963), 2 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1042 (1963),
[hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
4. Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (Jan. 11, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Advice
and consent given by the United States Senate on September 8, 1971. Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
5. Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping For Purposes of Extor-
tion, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1177 (1970).
6. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i).
7. Statement by President Nixon, Sept. 11, 1970, DEP'T STATE BULL. 341
(Sept. 28, 1970).
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in part, because of the heavy penalties rather than in spite of
them.5
It is customary international law to refuse extradition for of-
fenders accused of political crimes. The thrust of the aforemen-
tioned Conventions would be to create an exception to this rule.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Conventions' premises are correct,
this Comment will discuss the judicial history of the political crime
exception to extradition and the operative sections of the Tokyo
Convention, the Hague Convention and the O.A.S. Draft Con-
vention on Terrorism. Some conclusions will be offered concern-
ing the advisability of creating a general exclusion to the political
crime exception.
I. POLITICAL CRIMES AND RELATED OFFENSES
A. The Case Law
Extradition is not made by right, but by request, and is usu-
ally governed by treaty.9 Non-extradition of political offenders is
an established principle of international law.1"
The history of political exceptions to extradition began in
France in 1829.11 This was followed closely by the first recog-
nized statutory exception in Belgium in 1933.12 In 1855, Belgium
adopted what is commonly known as the Belgian attentat clause
after the country failed to extradite "Jules and Celestin Jacquin,
Frenchmen accused of attempting to blow up the train carrying
Napoleon III from Lille to Calais."' 3  The attentat clause, in its
basic form, denies the political exception to an attempt to murder
a head of State.14 The attentat clause is in widespread use al-
though it has never been accepted by either Switzerland or the
United Kingdom. 1 '
8. HUBBARD, supra note 1, at 80.
9. For example, the United States is a party to eighty-three treaties cov-
ering extradition, all of which contain a political exception clause.
10. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (8th ed. 1955).
11. Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27
AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (1933).
12. Id. at 251.
13. Id. at 252.
14. See, e.g., Article 357 of the Convention on Private International Law
(Bustamente Code), opened for signature Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 111.
15. Deere, supra note 11, at 253. Switzerland refuses recognition
since, under the predominance theory (discussed infra), any crime may have a
political character. The United Kingdom defines regicide as treason, hence
political.
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Two distinctions should be made. The first is between diplo-
matic and territorial asylum. The former refers to the asylum of
a party in the embassy or legation of the requested state which
lies within the territory of the requesting state while the latter is
asylum of a party within the territory of the requested state.,
Asylum requested by an aircraft highjacker is necessarily terri-
torial asylum." The discretion allowed a requested state in terri-
torial asylum is absolute while such is not the case in diplomatic
asylum.' 8
The second distinction is between "pure" and "related" po-
litical offenses. Pure political offenses are those against the po-
litical organization or external security of the State.' 9 They are
generally limited to treason, sedition, and espionage.2" A "re-
lated" or "relative" political offense is a common crime which is
either implicit in, or connected with, a political act.2 ' Since high-
jacking is a common crime,22 highjacking for a political motive
would, by definition, be a relative political offense. A common
crime implicit in a political act is known as a complex relative po-
litical offense. An example is the assassination of a sovereign. A
common crime which is connected with a political act is known as
a connected relative political offense. An example would be
breaking and entering a military installation to commit espionage.
Highjacking an aircraft could be either of these. If the plane was
highjacked for purposes of international blackmail, the offense
would be a complex relative political crime. However, if the
plane were highjacked merely to provide a means of escape from
an oppressive regime, the offense would be a connected relative
political offense.
Professor Garcia-Mord has divided the test for political of-
fenses into three basic types.2" These are the Swiss "predomi-
16. Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), [1950] Ann. Dig. 280 (No. 90)
(I.C.J.).
17. It is possible that an offender could highjack a helicopter and land on
embassy grounds. While turgid with interesting legal speculation, such an
occurrence is beyond the scope of this Comment.
18. [1950] Ann. Dig. at 282.
19. Deere, supra note 11, at 248.
20. Garcia-Mori, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of
International Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1234 (1962).
21. Deere, supra note 11.
22. Highjacking is a common crime either by statute or because it contains
the elements of other common crimes, e.g., kidnapping, assault, larceny.
23. Garcia-Morfi, supra note 20. See also Garcia-Mori, The Present Status
Vol. 2
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nance" test, the Anglo-American "incidence" test, and the French
"political objective" test.24
1. The Swiss Test.-The Swiss test is well defined in a 1951
case where the court said,
[a] relative political offense is one which, while having the
characteristics of a common offense, acquires a political char-
acter by virtue of the motive inspiring it, or the purpose for
which or the circumstances in which it has been committed,
in other words, it is in itself a common offence, but has a pre-
dominantly political character. 25
Earlier cases held that to qualify as a relative political offense, the
act must form a part of a civil disturbance aimed at overthrow-
ing the government. 26
This requirement was changed dramatically in 1952 in In Re
Kavic et al.27  Three Yugoslav members of the flight crew of an
intra-Yugoslavian flight subdued the remainder of the crew and
diverted the flight to Switzerland. The Yugoslav government re-
quested their extradition for the constraint to other members of
the crew, endangering the safety of public transport, and wrong-
ful appropriation of property. The alleged offenders contended,
in part, that the crimes were political in nature and therefore not
extraditable. In refusing to grant extradition, the Court said
that older cases held the term "political crime"
applies to the flight of a political opponent from the country
only if it is intended to continue the fight for power from
abroad. . . . That restrictive interpretation does not, how-
ever, bear re-examination: it does not meet the intention of
the law, nor take account of recent historical developments,
such as the growth of totalitarian States. In such States all
political opposition is suppressed and a fight for power is, if
not impossible from the start, at least practically without any
chance of success. Those who do not wish to submit to the
regime have no alternative but to escape it by flight abroad.
. . . This more passive attitude for the purpose of escaping
political constraint is no less worthy of asylum than active
of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. PIr. L. REV.
371 (1952-53).
24. Garcia-Mord, supra note 20.
25. In Re Ficorille, [1951] Ann. Dig. 345 (No. 110) (Federal Tribunal
Switzerland).
26. In re Kapengst, [1929-30] Ann. Dig. 292 (No. 188) (Federal Court
Switzerland).
27. [1952] Ann. Dig. 371 (No. 80) (Federal Tribunal Switzerland).
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participation in the fight for political power used to be in
what were earlier considered to be normal circumstances. 28
This opinion has been set out in some detail since it is the only in-
ternationally reported opinion to deal with air highjacking as a po-
litical crime. 29
A more recent case succinctly states the Swiss test for rela-
tive political offenses.80  "Political offences include offences
which, although constituting acts falling under the ordinary crimi-
nal law, have a predominantly political character as a result of the
circumstances in which they are committed. . . ."' The Swiss
motivation and predominance theory is followed by Argentina,32
Chile,33 and the German Federal Republic.34 The German Re-
public will also not extradite a "politically persecuted person" re-
gardless of the offense charged.35  While the motivational test
is followed in Austria 6 and Belguim,s7 there is also a requirement
for a civil disturbance.3 8
2. The Anglo-American Test.-The leading common law case
on the political exception to extradition is In Re Castioni.39 The
Court held that "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for
28. Id. at 373.
29. See Note, Prospects For The Prevention of Aircraft Highjacking
Through Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 60, 67 (1970).
30. Ktir v. Ministere Public Federal, 34 I.L.R. 143 (Federal Tribunal,
Switzerland, 1961).
31. Id. at 144. The language of this opinion can be confusing since this
court, as some others, divides relative political crimes into two categories, i.e.,
complex and connected.
32. Re Peyre, [1955] Ann. Dig. 525 (National Special Court Argentina);
In Re Bohne, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (Supreme Court, Argentina, 1966).
33. Re Garcia Zepeda, [1955] Ann. Dig. 528 (Supreme Court, Chile); Re
Campora, 24 I.L.R. 518 (Supreme Court, Chile, 1957).
34. Extradition (Ecuadorian National) Case, [19531 Ann. Dig. 370 (Fed-
eral Supreme Court, Germany).
35. Extradition of Greek National (Germany) Case, [1955] Ann. Dig. 520
(Federal Supreme Court, Germany); Extradition (Yugoslav Refugee in Ger-
many) Case, 28 I.L.R. 347 (Supreme Constitutional Court, Germany, 1959).
36. Hungarian Deserter (Austria) Case, 28 I.L.R. 343 (Supreme Court,
Austria, 1959) at 345 where the Court stated, "The political motive of a crimi-
nal offense does not in itself prove that the offense is political. The crime be-
comes a political offense only where it serves a political purpose, i.e., where the
offense is intended to bring about a change of political circumstances ... "
37. In Re Barrantini, [1939-40] Ann. Dig. 412 (No. 159) (Court of Ap-
peals, Belgium, 1936).
38. Hungarian Deserter (Austria) Case, supra note 36; In re Zouche et al.,
31 I.L.R. 386 (Court Cassation, Belgium, 1960).
39. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
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extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed a
part of political disturbances. '40  This case was closely followed
by another in 1894 which placed anarchy outside the political
crime exception.4' In Re Castioni has led authorities to proscribe
an Anglo-American test which requires, (1) a political or civil
disturbance in which at least two factions seek control of the gov-
ernment, and (2) that the crime complained of be incidental to
the disturbance.4 2 This test has been severely diluted by three re-
cent English cases. In 1954, the Queen's Bench decided Ex Parte
Kalcyznski,4' popularly known as the Polish Seamen's case. Seven
Polish Nationals mutinied aboard a Polish fishing vessel on the
high seas and sailed into a British port. Poland requested extra-
dition for the mutiny, damage to the vessel and exposing the ves-
sel to "the danger of calamity at sea and the entire crew to loss of
life."144 Basing its decision on In Re Castioni, the Court held that
since leaving Poland without permission was treason in accord-
ance with Polish law, the defendants were in danger of prosecu-
tion for a political crime and thus entitled to asylum.45 It should
be noted that the facts did not involve a political disturbance.
In Ex Parte Schtraks,46 the House of Lords, in adjudicating
a clearly non-political case, took the opportunity to offer an ex-
pansion of the Castioni doctrine in relation to the same legisla-
tion47 which Castioni interpreted. Lord Reid said, "The use of
force, or it may be other means to compel a sovereign to change
his advisors, or to compel a government to change its policies
may be just as political in character as the use of force to achieve
a revolution. ' 48  The most recent comment by an English Court
40. Id. at 166.
41. In Re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
42. Garcia-Mord, supra note 20, at 1240; See also Garcia-Mori, supra
note 23, at 378; Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offense in International
Practice, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1963).
43. 21 I.L.R. 240 (Queen's Bench, England, 1954).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 243.
46. [19621 3 W.L.R. 1013 (House of Lords).
47. EXTRADITION AcT, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, § 3(1).
48. [1962] 3 W.L.R. at 1026. The significance of Lord Reid's remarks for
the Western nations is obvious. By this definition, the political exception would
include an opponent to United States involvement in the Vietnam war or the
United Kingdom's attitude toward South Africa. It demolishes the theory into
which democratic regimes have so comfortably fitted themselves that any oppo-
sition must come from either the anarchistic left or the totalitarian right and
may be summarily dealt with.
1971
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was Re Gross in 1968."9 Citing Castioni, Meunier,50 Kakcyznski,
and Schtraks, the Court stated the test as being whether the of-
fender "could claim with any prospect of success political asy-
lum."" 1 The English Courts, therefore, seem to be moving from
a strict Castioni interpretation toward the more tolerant Swiss
relative interpretation. 51
American courts have generally followed the Castioni rule
as indicated in the most recent American case, In Re Gonzales. 3
The Court in Gonzales states the Castioni test but goes further
in stating that "notwithstanding the validity of this general proposi-
tion of law, it must be emphasized that the 'political offense' con-
cept is essentially a flexible one."' 54  The Court then goes on to
discuss Kalcyznski5 5 It should be noted that the Court had the
benefit of neither Schtraks nor Gross.5 6
3. The French Test.-The French objective right test goes to
the nature of the rights injured rather than the motive of the of-
fender.17 A political crime is one which "only affects the political
organization of the state.15 8  Thus, France recognizes only the
pure political crime and not the relative political crime. 9 This
viewpoint has not been widely accepted.
4. Application of the Tests to Highjacking.--Only the Swiss
Courts have actually adjudicated an aircraft highjacking. In Re
Kavic, on its facts, would apply strictly to a highjacking as an
escape mechanism from a totalitarian regime in which no passen-
gers were involved. The highjacking in Kavic was a connected
relative political offense. If the Swiss Courts were faced with a
highjacking as a complex relative political offense or if another
common crime (such as murder of a member of the crew) was
committed, the predominance test would be applied and the
case decided on its facts.
49. Re Gross et al. [1968] 3 All E.R. 804 (Q.B.D.).
50. In Re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
51. [1968] 3 All E.R. at 810.
52. See Evans, supra note 42.
53. 34 I.L.R. 139 (U.S. District Court, New York, 1963).
54. Id. at 140 n.3 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
56. See also Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957) and
U.S. v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
57. In Re Giovanni Gatti, [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70) (Court of
Appeals, France).
58. Id.
59. Garcia-Mori, supra note 20, at 1249.
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In an American or English Court, under Castioni and suc-
ceeding cases, if there were any factual political connection what-
soever, aircraft highjacking would be a political crime.
The French test is, of course, simply applied. Highjacking,
prima facie, injures rights other than those of the State and assum-
ing applicable treaties, the offenders should be extradited.
B. Multilateral Agreements
The only multilateral agreement related to aircraft highjack-
ing currently in force is the Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo on
September 14, 1963.60 The Convention, having been ratified by
twelve states, entered into force on December 9, 1969.61 The
Inter-American Juridical Committee has recommended a draft
treaty to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States.6" The Permanent Council agreed on November 4, 1970, to
refer this draft to the General Committee for study.6 3  A new
multilateral Convention on aircraft highjacking was signed at a
Diplomatic Convention on Air in December, 1970.64
1. The Tokyo Convention.-Extradition may be granted by the
state in which a highjacked aircraft lands.6 5 However, extradi-
tion is entirely the prerogative of that state. 66 There are three ob-
stacles to extradition.
The first is the physical application of the Convention. The
Convention applies from the moment all the "external doors are
closed following embarkation until the moment any such door is
opened for disembarkation. '6 7 It is further indicated that the ap-
plication of the Convention continues after a door has been opened
for disembarkation if the pilot has made a "forced landing" and
until competent authorities of the landing state "take over the re-
sponsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and property on
60. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3.
61. Van Panhuys, Aircraft Highiacking and International Law, 9 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1970).
62. O.A.S. Draft, supra note 5.
63. Id.
64. Hague Convention, supra note 4.
65. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3, Article 13, 2.
66. Id. at Article 16, 2.
67. Id. at Article 5, 2; See also Denaro, Inflight Crimes, The Tokyo
Convention and Federal Jurisdiction, 35 1. AIR L. & CoM. 171, 173 (1969).
1971
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board."6  The Chief Delegate of the United States to the Con-
vention has interpreted this article to mean that the provisions
continue to apply until landing State authorities arrive at the scene
of the landing. 69 This interpretation would avoid problems of ap-
plication when the highjacker retains control of the aircraft for a
time period after landing and the opening of a door. This raises
problems, however, concerning application during intermediate
stops (refueling, etc.) which are beyond the scope of this com-
ment.
The second obstacle is the jurisdiction of any state other than
the state of landing to try the offender. The Convention extends
jurisdiction of the aircraft's state of registration to offenses and
acts committed on board but does not exclude any criminal juris-
diction exercised in accordance with national law.7" Jurisdiction,
therefore, may be exercised by the state of registration, the
landing state, or any state through which the aircraft passes while
the offense continues.71  The ICAO Legal Committee discussed
priority arrangements of jurisdiction, however none were included
in the Convention.72  The net practical effect is that the landing
state has immediate jurisdiction due to physical custody of the
highjackers and the requirement under the Convention to make a
preliminary inquiry. 73  The State of registration has jurisdiction
if the landing state is willing to extradite the alleged offender.74
Although offenses committed on board are deemed to have oc-
curred both in the state of registration and the state of actual oc-
curance, nothing in the Convention "shall be deemed to create an
obligation to grant extradition. ' 75  In view of the recent United
States position, it is interesting to note that United States comment
on the ICAO Legal Committee meeting in Munich in 1959, "reit-
erated the United States position expressed at Munich that the
draft convention should contain an article to the effect that (1)
68. Id.
69. Boyle and Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircralt, 30 J. Am L. & CoM. 305, 338
(1964).
70. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3, at Article 3.
71. Denaro, supra note 67, at 191.
72. Boyle and Pulsifer, supra note 69, at 328.
73. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3, at Article 13, 4.
74. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3, at Article 3 and Article 13, 2;
Denaro, supra note 67, at 191.
75. Tokyo Convention, supra note 3, at Article 16, 2.
Vol. 2
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nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to create a right to re-
quest extradition of any person. ... 7
The third, most serious, and probably overwhelming ob-
stacle is that the Convention specifically does not apply to politi-
cal offenses. Article 2 states that:
except when the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property
on board so requires, no provision of this Convention shall be
interpreted as authorizing or requiring any action in respect
of offences against penal laws of a political nature or those
based on racial or religious discrimination.
It could be argued that this provision applies only to pure politi-
cal crimes. However, nations seeking to avoid extradition would
doubtless seize upon it, while bolstering their argument with the
Swiss case of In Re Kavic."
2. The Hague Convention.-Some historical perspective is es-
sential to understanding the forces which culminated their efforts in
the signing of the Hague Convention in December, 1970. The
Tokyo Convention was the product of efforts by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It was drafted in 1961 and
1962, before highjacking became popular with non-pilots.78 The
Convention was not intended to specifically deter aircraft high-
jacking, political or otherwise; and, during the middle and late
1960's, it became apparent that it would not do so."'
The response of the community of nations to air highjack-
ing grew steadily more strident. In March, 1969, the situation had
deteriorated to the point that the International Federation of Air-
line Pilot's Associations (IFALPA) at their twenty-fourth An-
nual Conference resolved that an embargo of all air traffic should
be imposed on any State refusing to institute appropriate proceed-
ings against a highjacker.80 In addition, the Association resolved
to coordinate with other organizations to restrict air and surface
cargo to and from the offending State and to call a world-wide
twelve to twenty-four hour pilot's strike to dramatize the inci-
dent.8 ' In the only attempt thus far to implement the resolution,
76. Boyle and Pulsifer, supra note 69, at 324.
77. See note 27 supra.
78. HUBBARD, supra note 1, at 211.
79. FitzGerald, Development of International Legal Rules for the Repres-
sion of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 297 n.99
(1969).
80. Note, Prospects for the Prevention of Aircraft Highiacking Through
Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 60, 74 (1970).
81. Id.
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United Nations Secretary-General U Thant interceded in a pro-
posed action against Syria stating that it "would not achieve the
desired result" and would "only cause serious inconveniences to
airline passengers throughout the world."'8 2
In April, 1969, the ICAO Council established a special Com-
mittee to draft a proposed convention. 3 Meanwhile, the ICAO
Legal Committee began a series of three meetings which ulti-
mately produced the Draft Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft.8 4  "The draft was received by the ICAO Council and
transmitted to Governments as the draft to be considered by a
diplomatic conference scheduled for December, 1970.''85
The Montreal Draft was, for all intents and purposes, a
more explicit version of the Tokyo Convention. It outlined the
procedure to be followed by a landing State in dealing with al-
leged offenders.8 6 Prosecution must be contemplated but was not
required. 7  Extradition was based on the law of the requested
State88 which might or might not exclude political crimes. These
decisions were not without opposition as indicated by Senior ICAO
Counsel Gerald F. FitzGerald. 9 "The majority view was that
the state should have a discretion whether to prosecute or not, and
that it should refer the matter to its competent authorities with a
82. Id.
83. Statement by Secretary of Transportation Volpe to ICAO Council,
Oct. 1, 1970, DEP'T STATE BULL. 449 (Oct. 19, 1970).
84. Draft Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, ICAO Doc.
8865, LC/159 of March 16, 1970, 9 INT'L LEGAL. MATERIALS 669 and footnoted
references [hereinafter Montreal Draft].
85. Id.
86. Montreal Draft, supra note 84, at Articles 6-8.
87. The text of the pertinent sections of the Montreal Draft reads as
follows:
Article 6, 4: "The State which makes the preliminary inquiry . . . shall
promptly report its findings . . . and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise
jurisdiction."
Article 7: "The Contracting State which has taken measures pursuant to
Article 6, paragraph 1 [preliminary inquiry] shall, if it does not extradite the
alleged offender, be obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for
their decision whether to prosecute him. These authorities shall take their deci-
sion in the same manner as in the case of other offenses."
Article 8, f 2: "The Contracting States which do not make extradition
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offense as an
extraditable offense between themselves subject to the conditions established by
the law of the State requested to extradite."
88. Id.
89. FitzGerald, supra note 79, at 290.
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view to initiating proceedings." The Committee decided by a nine
to three majority (the United States dissenting) that a requested
State might refuse extradition when the alleged offender was a na-
tional of the requesting State and "was seeking asylum from per-
secution or acted from political motives." 90 The Committee
unanimously decided that the requested state could refuse extradi-
tion if it considered the purpose political."' At a later meeting in
the Fall of 1969, the United States withdrew its objection to the
political exception. 92
Meanwhile, more militant forces in the international com-
munity were also voicing their opinions on highjacking as a politi-
cal crime. At the Bangkok Fourth World Conference on World
Peace Through Law, a committee was appointed to draft an ap-
propriate multilateral convention.93 The document produced did
not specifically mention a possible political motivation in high-
jacking. 94  It did, however, brand as a "pirate" anyone who "com-
mits or attempts to commit aircraft hijacking."95  This term a
priori excludes a political motive since piracy by definition is an
act taken for private ends.98 However, Article 7 of the Montreal
Draft Convention is substantially reproduced.97 Under this arti-
cle, a Contracting State could exercise its own jurisdiction and
refuse to prosecute the highjacking as a political crime.98 It is in-
teresting that this convention requires the landing State to forward
the alleged offender "to the State to which the aircraft was destined
before the highjacking" which would presumably have neither the
interest nor the jurisdiction to prosecute him.99
90. Id. at 292.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 297 n.99(5).
93. Convention to Deter Aircraft Highjacking, Pamphlet Series No. 13,
Dec. 1969, World Peace Through Law Center, 75 Rue de Leon, Geneva,
Switzerland [hereinafter WPTLC Draft].
94. Id.
95. WPTLC Draft, supra note 93, at Article 2, 1.
96. Van Panhuys, supra note 61, at 5: "For private ends" is defined not
only as acts motivated by animus furandi, but also by revenge or hate.
97. WPTLC Draft, supra note 93, at Article 9 which states: "The Con-
tracting State which has taken measures pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1
[restraint of offender pending criminal or extradition proceedings], shall, if it
does not extradite the alleged offender, be obliged to submit the case to its
competent authorities for their decision whether legal proceedings should be ini-
tiated against him. These authorities shall make their decision in the same
manner as in the case of other offenses."
98. See In Re Kavic, supra note 27.
99. WPTLC Draft, supra note 93, at Article 4, (b). A recent draft
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The rhetoric continued unabated into 1970. In June, an Ex-
traordinary Session of the ICAO Council passed the Montreal Dec-
laration calling upon States to take effective measures to deter
highjacking and punish those responsible.10 In September, the
Security Council of the United Nations "unanimously adopted a
resolution calling on states to take all possible legal steps to pre-
vent further hijackings or other interferences with international
civil air travel."''
On September 11, 1970, President Nixon announced the fol-
lowing unilateral action by the United States: 10 2
1. Armed United States government personnel would ride
United States commercial flights;
2. American flag carriers were to expand their use of surveil-
lance devices while the Federal government would provide
enforcement officers;
3. That the United States felt it was "imperative" all coun-
tries accept the Montreal draft convention; 03
4. That the United States proposed an international boycott
of countries which "refused to punish or extradite high-
jackers involved in international blackmail;" and,
5. The United States would hold landing States responsible
for protecting the lives and property of United States citi-
zens.
The Secretary of State was directed to request an immediate ses-
sion of the ICAO Council to consider the boycott suggestion. 04
One week later on September 18, 1970, United States Secre-
tary of Transportation John Volpe addressed a special meeting of
treaty submitted to the World Peace Through Center advocates the incarceration
in Spandau prison of all persons accused of highjacking. The International
Court of Justice would have original trial jurisdiction over the accused. The
proposed treaty defines highjacking and permits no punishment more severe than
that allowed by the laws of the country which originally obtained jurisdiction of
the accused. The submitted draft is an example of the French test; in that only
the injured rights of the highjacked are considered and not the motives of the
highjacker. This blunderbuss approach to highjacking is extraordinarily un-
realistic since nations commonly use their sovereignty to protect those whom
they consider to be free from evil intent. See also Smith, The Probable
Necessity of an International Prison in Solving Aircraft Highjacking, 5 INT'L
LAWYER 269 (1971).
100. DEP'T STATE BULL. 303 (Sept. 14, 1970).
101. See note 83 supra, at 450.
102. See note 7 supra.
103. See note 84 supra.
104. See note 7 supra, at 342.
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the ICAO Council.' 0 He stated that the United States felt a
"heightened sense of emergency" due to the recent use of high-
jacking for international blackmail. °6 The U.S. draft resolution
called for two actions by the Council. 10 7 First, that international
air transport services be suspended to any nation which indulged
in international blackmail and, secondly, that the ICAO Legal
Committee be directed to draw up a draft multilateral convention
to embody this principle.' 08  The adopted resolution, passed
on October 1, 1970, called for "Contracting States . . . to consult
together immediately with a view to deciding what joint action
should be undertaken" not excluding a boycott. 109 The Legal Com-
mittee was directed to draw up a draft convention to provide a
legal vehicle for such consultations." 0
A Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft was signed by forty-nine countries at a Diplomatic Con-
ference on Air Law at The Hague on December 15, 1970, and
will come into force when ratified by ten nations."'
The Convention provides that jurisdiction over an alleged
highjacker may be exercised by any of four countries. These are
the state of registration of the aircraft, the state in which a high-
jacked aircraft lands, the state of domicile of a lessee under a bare-
hull charter, and any state who is a party to the Convention and
in whose territory an alleged offender may be found." 2  This last
category is especially significant since, at least among party states,
it establishes aircraft highjacking as an international crime.
Extradition is not specifically required by the Convention and
the term "political crime" is not mentioned. The key article re-
lating to extradition and prosecution is Article 7 which reads:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the al-
leged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him,
be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not
105. See note 83 supra.
106. Id. at 450.
107. id. at 453.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hague Convention, supra note 4, at Article 13, 3. As of Sept. 27,
1971, the following countries had deposited ratifications: Bulgaria (May 19,
1971, with a reservation), Costa Rica (July 9, 1971), Ecuador (June 14,
1971), Hungary (August 13, 1971, with a reservation), Israel (August 16,
1971), Japan (April 19, 1971), and Sweden (July 7, 1971).
112. Hague Convention, supra note 4, at Article 4.
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the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same
manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious
nature under the law of that State.
The language of this article would support the theory that states
having custody of an offender may extradite or not, at their plea-
sure. This is supported by the language of Article 10.113
The status of a state's discretion to prosecute is less clear. Ar-
ticle 7 leaves the decision to the state's "competent authorities."
However, the same article restricts that decision to considering air-
craft highjacking as an "ordinary" offense. If the term "ordinary"
really means "common", then political motivation is excluded.
In the case of In Re Kavic,"I for example, the Polish Govern-
ment charged the highjackers with several common or ordinary
crimes. The Swiss Court found that the highjackers were moti-
vated by a political desire to escape a totalitarian regime and re-
fused to prosecute. In a similar case, The Hague Convention
would allow the state to grant political asylum but would require
the competent authorities to prosecute the highjackers. The pen-
alty for such a crime in the United States is death."15
3. Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping of Persons
for Purposes of Extortion.-During the late summer and early fall
of 1970, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organiza-
tion of American States met and produced a draft convention on
terrorism. 1 6 This draft is the first multi-national document to
specifically denounce air highjacking as a prima facie non-politi-
cal crime. 7 This is done by the circuitous method of branding
terrorism as nonpolitical and then defining air highjacking as a
form of terrorism." 8 Terrorism is non-political because the Com-
mittee's:
113. Id. at Article 10, % 1 which reads: "Contracting States shall afford
one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal pro-
ceedings brought in respect of the offense and other acts mentioned in Article 4.
The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases."
114. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 6 supra.
116. See note 5 supra.
117. O.A.S. Draft, supra note 5, at Article 3 which reads: "The acts of
terrorism to which this Convention refers . . . do not constitute political of-
fenses or common crimes connected with political offenses."
118. O.A.S. Draft, supra note 5, at Article 4 which states: "For the pur-
poses of this convention . . . the following shall be considered to be acts of
Vol. 2
15
Lynn: Air Highjacking as a Political Crime - Who Should Judge?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1971
AIR HIGH JACKING AS A POLITICAL CRIME
Criterion is based as much on the material results of the
terrorist acts as upon the inhuman, irrational and dispropor-
tionate means employed to commit them, and this is done
without taking into account-since they are not relevant-
the motives that impelled those who caused the acts." 19
The Committee cites the Belgian attentat"2 as a previous example
of outlawing a political offense. 121 The Committee reasons that
this protection to sovereigns should now be extended to all hu-
man beings.121
The Convention requires extradition and does not allow ter-
ritorial or diplomatic asylum.' 23 If, for any reason, an alleged of-
fender is not extradited, the state which captures him is required
to prosecute. This is true in whatever party state the alleged of-
fender may be found. 12 4
4. The Conventions in Perspective.-Viewed together, these
Conventions indicate two important trends in customary interna-
tional law. The first trend is the establishment of an attentat type
exclusion to the political exception to extradition; the Tokyo Con-
vention did not attempt to establish this. The members of the
Tokyo Convention discussed the matter and decided the political
exception should remain undisturbed. The Hague Convention
did not mention the political exception. The inclusion of one
equivocal word, "ordinary", in Article 7 gives the extraditing
state the option to refuse or to grant extradition based on political
motivation. The O.A.S. Draft Convention on Terrorism cate-
gorically denies political motivation as a valid exception to extra-
dition.
The second important trend is the classification of aircraft
highjacking as an international crime for purposes of jurisdiction.
Any party state to The Hague or O.A.S. Draft Conventions may
try an offender regardless of where the crime was committed. If
this trend continues, aircraft highjackers, like pirates, will be tri-
able anywhere.
terrorism: . . . the taking over, the violent seizure, or the wrecking of a ship,
aircraft, or other means of collective transport."
119. Inter-American Juridical Committee: Statement of Reasons for the
Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1250,
1258 (1970).
120. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
121. Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 118.
122. Id. at 1261.
123. O.A.S. Draft, supra note 5, at Article 5.
124. Id. at Article 7.
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II. CONCLUSION
An initial objection to Conventions such as these is their
unworkability. The Hague Convention was approved by 74 na-
tions but the significance lies in who did not sign. The non-signers
included Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt; in other
words, the very Arab states at whom the agreement is aimed.
Conventions do not impose duties on non-signers. There must
be universal acceptance before there can be universal enforcement.
A second, and more important objection is their overbreadth.
The Belgian attentat deals only with a complex relative political
crime. The murder of a sovereign is not merely incidental to a
revolution. Removing the yoke of the sovereign is the revolution.
Aircraft highjacking, however, can be either a complex relative
political offense or a connected relative political offense. High-
jacking for extortion or blackmail is complex. Highjacking to es-
cape is a mere connection. The imposition of an arbitrary rule
before the fact does not allow sufficient freedom to determine the
equity in a particular case. The Swiss courts have refused to ac-
cept the attentat clause for precisely that reason.
The O.A.S. Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping
has not yet been signed. Prior to opening for signature, the defi-
nition of terrorism should be more narrowly drawn to exclude
those who highjack to escape and include those who highjack to
extort. In ratifying the Hague Convention all nations, by the use
of a reservation, should retain their freedom to fairly decide the
fate of those who seek asylum on their shores.
Robert H. Lynn
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